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Abstract 
We provide an overview of the systematic evidence relating to the impact of private equity 
backed buyouts over the last two decades. We focus on performance; employment and 
employee relations; innovation, investment and entrepreneurship; longevity and survival. We 
also explore a future research agenda in the context of a maturing PE industry.  
 
Introduction 
Private Equity (PE) firms acquire a portfolio of firms via a Leveraged Buyout (LBO). Mature 
businesses (either listed or private/family-owned) and divisions/subsidiaries of large firms are 
targeted for such deals. PE-backed LBOs first came to prominence in the US during the 1980s 
when large listed firms, such as Safeway and RJR Nabisco, were acquired. LBOs attracted 
controversy and created debate concerning the efficacy of both the public limited company 
(PLC) and the LBO governance structure that was installed after the deal. Jensen (1989) 
proposed that the LBO governance structure was superior to that of PLCs. He argued that 
increased management ownership, high leverage, and monitoring by PE firms after an LBO 
provided management in portfolio firms with incentives to focus on performance. Moreover, 
the PLC governance structure had demonstrated itself incapable of providing senior 
management with such powerful incentives. In response, Rappaport (1990) drew attention to 
the weaknesses of the LBO governance structure. High levels of debt create strategic 
inflexibility and PE firms have a business model that leads them to focus on short-term 
performance improvements prior to their exit. This controversy still persists.  
 
Since the 1980s, PE activity has gone through several waves and the LBO governance structure 
has not superseded the PLC in most large firms in the US or UK. Nevertheless, PE-backed 
LBOs have become a global phenomenon and are a significant ownership structure in many 
countries. Propelled by low interest rates on other asset classes and a record $1.1tn of cash 
pledged worldwide by investors, buyout volumes in 2017 were up 27 per cent year on year 
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(Espinoza 2018). Cross-country patterns also witnessed a substantial change. For example, UK 
dominance of the European market twenty years ago is being eroded as deal value came neck-
and-neck with that in Germany (CMBOR 2017).  
 
The importance of PE as a research topic has similarly grown over the last twenty years. 
Citations to PE journal articles rose to just below 5,000 by 2006, increasing sharply in 2007 
and 2008 around the time the market peaked, with subsequent steady growth to top 10,000 in 
2012 (Cumming and Johan, 2017). This could be driven by a curiosity to understand more 
about PE activity and also by the fact that the impact of PE-backed LBOs continues to be 
contentious with respect to: performance gains; employment and employee relations; longer 
term effects on innovation and investment; and the longevity and survival of portfolio firms. 
In this article we first take a retrospective look at the impact of PE-backed buyouts in the two 
decades since the foundation of this journal, and then set out a vision for future research.  
 
Where have we been? Busting the myths 
There is now extensive academic evidence on the impact of PE-backed LBOs. This systematic 
examination has enabled a number of myths about the effects, both positive and negative, to be 
debunked. The following sections provide an overview. 
 
Fund level: performance of the asset class 
Wealthy individuals and institutions (e.g. pension funds, insurance companies, and 
endowments) invest in PE funds as Limited Partners (LPs). The PE firm that manages funds is 
the General Partner (GP). LPs are therefore concerned with how well GPs manage funds and 
generate performance. There are four main issues concerning the measurement of fund 
performance: the quality of data available; whether performance is measured gross or net of 
4 
 
fees; how continuing and dead funds are valued; and the choice of benchmark to adjust for risk 
(Kaplan and Schoar 2005; Phalippou and Gottschalg 2009; Phalippou 2014). Earlier studies 
tackled these issues to a various extent and reported that PE funds had neutral or superior gross 
performance compared to investment in public market equivalents (Kaplan and Schoar 2005). 
More recent studies find that investors in PE funds barely break even after fees and carry 
(Driessen, Lin and Phalippou 2012; Franzoni, Nowak, and Phalippou 2012; Sørensen, Wang, 
and Yang 2014; Jegadeesh, Kräussl, and Pollet 2015). 
 
Another related issue is the persistence in performance of top PE firms (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, 
and Vissing-Jørgensen 2014). Most recent evidence finds that as the industry has become more 
competitive, performance has either declined (Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai 2007; Sensoy, 
Wang, and Weisbach 2014; Braun, Jenkinsson, and Stoff  2017) or ‘noise’ has made it difficult 
for investors to pick the best performers (Korteweg and Sorensen 2017).  
 
Portfolio firm 
Profitability and productivity 
PE firms are active investors in their portfolio firms, seeking to implement strategies for 
performance improvements. Both firm- (Amess 2003) and plant-level studies (Lichtenberg and 
Siegel 1990) demonstrate improvements in productivity, with buyout plants shifted from 
under-performing their sector pre-buyout to subsequently outperforming it (Harris, Siegel, and 
Wright 2005). However, profitability gains in US deals conducted in the 1990s and early 2000s 
appear to be less than those reported for deals conducted in the 1980s (Guo, Hotchkiss, and 
Song 2011). European studies have also drawn attention to the growth, cost-cutting and 
efficiency aspects of buyouts (Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar 2011; Wilson et al. 2012). Yet, 
indications are that enhanced profitability has been significantly associated with operating 
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gains, sector-specific expertise of PE firms, and geographic proximity of lead investors to their 
target companies (Cumming, Siegel, and Wright 2007; Cressy, Munari, and Malipiero 2007; 
Scellato and Ughetto 2013; Bernstein and Sheen 2016).  
 
Employment and employee relations 
The impact of PE on jobs has been highly contentious. Critics claim PE firms boost profits in 
portfolio firms by cutting jobs. In contrast, proponents argue that PE creates value by pursuing 
profitable growth strategies, which in turn creates jobs. Determining the relative merits of these 
competing arguments has motivated academics to conduct empirical analyses using firm-, 
plant-, and employee-level data from a variety of national and international sources. 
 
Firm-level evidence is mixed, with some studies reporting that PE involvement in the deal has 
no statistically significant impact on employment (Bergström, Grubb, and Johnsson 2007; 
Amess and Wright 2012), and others pointing to positive impact in both the short- and medium-
term (Scellato and Ughetto 2013). Data that account for job creation and destruction at 
establishment levels reveal that PE-backed buyouts are catalysts for a process of creative 
destruction not captured in firm-level studies (Davis et al. 2014). Findings on this issue are 
sensitive to the methods employed (Amess, Girma, and Wright 2014). 
 
Types of buyout deals and their sources differentially influence employment. Insider driven 
deals (Management Buyouts) generally increase employment (Amess and Wright 2007) while 
outsider driven deals such as Management Buy-Ins (Amess and Wright 2007) are associated 
with a decline. Meuleman et al. (2009) find that employment growth is higher in divisional 
buyouts compared to secondary, private, and family buyouts. Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar 
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(2011) also report that employment grows in private-to-private deals and secondary buyouts 
(SBOs).  
 
The impact of PE on jobs depends on the type of job and employee characteristics. Lichtenberg 
and Siegel (1990) found a reduction in the number of non-production workers employed in US 
buyouts but no significant effect on production workers. Olsson and Tåg (2017) report that 
Swedish employees performing routine jobs experience an increase in employment, whereas 
workers performing off-shorable tasks experience higher unemployment.  
 
Critics of PE-backed LBOs argue that they lead to deterioration in employee work conditions 
as new owners seek to cut costs to improve profits. Systematic studies, however, find little 
evidence to support the negative impact of buyouts on employee and industrial relations 
practices such as training, job discretion, consultation, role of trade unions, etc. (Bacon et al. 
2013). Recent work by Cohn et al. (2017) documents large and persistent reductions in post-
buyout workplace injury rates for public-to-private buyouts, albeit the effect is absent in private 
buyouts. 
 
Innovation, investment, entrepreneurship and growth 
PE-backed LBOs may enable managers with an entrepreneurial mindset to pursue 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Bruining and Wright 2002; Wright et al. 2000), resulting in 
increased new product development (Wright, Thompson and Robbie 1992; Zahra 1995). PE- 
backed LBOs also reduce financial constraints, potentially leading to increased investment 
(Bertoni, Ferrer, and Marti 2013; Engel and Stiebale 2014; Ughetto 2016). For R&D 
expenditure, evidence is mixed (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990; Long and Ravenscraft 1993). 
PE and its characteristics have a positive impact on patenting activity (Ughetto 2010; Lerner, 
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Sorensen, and Stromberg 2011; Amess, Stiebale, and Wright 2015). Increased patenting 
activity is strongest in private firms (Amess, Stiebale, and Wright 2015), and firm growth is 
strongest in subsidiaries/divisions and private firms (Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar 2011; 
Meuleman et al. 2009), businesses that are most likely to be financially constrained pre-LBO. 
 
Life-cycle/Longevity 
There is criticism that the PE business model involves boosting the short-term profit of 
portfolio firms and exiting within a short time period. However, studies show a heterogeneous 
time to exit by investors; some portfolio firms indeed assume an LBO governance structure for 
short periods while others retain it for long periods (Kaplan 1991; Wright et al. 1995). The 
mean time to investor exit appears to have increased since the financial crash from a little over 
5 years in 2007 to over 6 years in 2013 (Wright 2016).  
 
More recently, there has been a rise in follow-on buyouts e.g., secondary buyouts (SBOs), (and 
also third and fourth time buyouts, and so on), where initial investors exit fully or partially to 
be replaced by new investors. All or part of the management team may also exit during a 
follow-on buyout. In recent years, the annual value of SBOs has been close to that for primary 
deals and in some years has exceeded it, notably in 2017 when SBO deals amounted to £14.8bn 
compared with £13.4bn for primary deals (CMBOR 2018). Evidence on the overall 
performance of SBOs is mixed. While Achleitner and Figge (2014) show improved operational 
performance, Bonini (2015), Zhou, Jelic, and Wright (2014) and Alperovych, Amess and 
Wright (2013) find that performance deteriorates, Jelic and Wright (2011) find positive and 
negative effects, and Wang (2012) finds no effect. Using PE firm level data, Degeorge, Martin 
and Phalippou (2016) find that SBOs underperform when they are made by PE firms under 
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pressure to spend capital, but perform as well as other buyouts when the buyer is not under 
pressure to spend funds (Arcot et al. 2015). 
 
Critics also suggest that PE-backed buyouts are more likely to fail or enter financial distress as 
a result of leverage. Studies in the US (e.g. Hotchkiss, Smith and Stromberg 2012; Cohn, Mills, 
and Towery 2014), UK (Wilson and Wright, 2013) and Europe (Tykvova and Borell, 2012) 
show that PE-backed buyouts are no more likely to enter financial distress or bankruptcy than 
other comparable companies. This is partly due to selecting targets that have strong cash flow 
potential to service the debt but also because PE investors are proactive in negotiating the 
resolution of distress with creditors. Debt recovery rates of PE-backed buyouts that enter 
bankruptcy proceedings are also greater than for non-buyouts (Wright et al. 2014). 
 
The road ahead 
PE firms face challenges as the industry matures beyond its initial beginnings as an emerging 
and unfamiliar asset class. Below, we outline a research agenda relating to PE firms, portfolio 
firms, and individuals. We also discuss data challenges in the conduct of future PE research. 
 
PE firms 
Financing 
The maturity of the PE industry has changed access to funds for PE firms, and altered the 
relationship between LPs, GPs, and portfolio companies (Sensoy, Wang, and Weisbach 2014). 
Over the past twenty years many institutional investors have included PE as part of their 
portfolios, allowing PE funds to raise large amounts of cash; however, the increased number 
of funds makes it hard to find attractively priced companies to invest in (Espinoza 2018). The 
massive amounts of existing dry powder, the continuing inflow of funds to the industry, and 
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the resulting competition between LPs to subscribe to the top PE funds, has also raised 
questions concerning the scalability of PE (Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou, and Gottschalg 
2015). Moreover, direct investing by experienced institutional investors apparently produces 
better returns than co-investing through PE firms (Fang et al., 2015). Many sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs) are also directly investing in firms, rather than hiring GPs, to avoid management 
fees (Wright and Amess 2017). Yet, the literature studying these issues focuses mainly on the 
returns of financial intermediaries. Research is needed to explore the strategies GPs adopt in a 
mature market rather than relying on past practices. How do GPs cope with increased 
competition? How do GPs remain attractive to LPs? How does competition impact PE 
investment decisions? 
 
As dependence on debt nears record levels, and aggressive and rapid deal making leads to 
soaring prices for companies, a prospective increase in interest rates might lead to a collapse 
of highly leveraged PE structures. What is then the impact of a combination of overpricing and 
high leverage on LPs returns and the consequences for stakeholders, including: employees, 
customers, and pensioners? An emerging trend seems to be for PE firms to attempt to mitigate 
these problems by developing proprietary deal flow and concluding so-called ‘bilateral’ deals 
between themselves and vendors rather than engaging in auctions. Future research might 
usefully explore the extent and effectiveness of such a strategy. 
 
Earlier evidence of outperformance of different types of LPs is no longer apparent. For 
example, Lerner et al. (2007) reported the outperformance of endowments as an investor class; 
however, Sensoy et al. (2014) challenge this conclusion by documenting endowments’ access 
to the best funds, rather than superior skill at picking funds, as likely driving their performance. 
Research on investor characteristics suggests that LP size is an influential variable impacting 
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variation in investor behaviour and investor criteria (Da Rin et al 2017). Further research is 
needed on the interaction between investor types (e.g. size, location, experience), and their 
strategy and performance. 
 
Traditionally, syndication has been analysed in terms of co-investments between PE firms. 
Recent years have seen a marked rise in the entry of debt funds that are fuelling market growth 
and an increase in leverage in deal structures. What are the implications of increasing leverage 
for syndication between traditional PE firms and other forms of fund providers such as SWFs 
and debt funds? Does the relatively large size, and hence potentially higher bargaining power, 
of SWFs influence PE firm behaviour?  
 
Finally, the evidence reviewed above indicates that overall PE fund performance is not 
extraordinary. Large amounts of dry powder and favourable debt market conditions are factors 
responsible for intense competition for deals and their soaring prices. It is therefore unclear 
whether the PE business model is sustainable. How and from what sources will PE generate 
further returns if the aggregate supply of profitable deals does not change over time? If 
operational and financial engineering are not enough to create value, what other channels are 
available? 
 
Transparency 
PE firms have developed a variety of ways to generate revenues. These include management 
fees imposed on LPs, as well as transaction and monitoring fees imposed on portfolio 
companies (Phalippou, Rauch, and Umber forthcoming). Obscure PE arrangements and 
compensation structures seem to create room for various agency issues involving excessive 
risk taking (Magnuson forthcoming; Gredil 2017), and misreporting of returns and Net Asset 
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Values, especially during fundraising periods (Barber and Yasuda 2017; Brown, Gredil and 
Kaplan forthcoming), and overall reduction in the ways LPs can effectively monitor and control 
GPs. A recent EU MIFID 2 initiative (BVCA 2017) now applicable to PE firms operating in 
Europe seeks to enhance investor protection, though the consequences of this for LPs, and their 
relationship with GPs, are yet to be observed and studied. 
  
Greater transparency is necessary to facilitate new investigations of the agency between LPs 
and GPs. Such inquiries can shed light on various contractual issues between different kinds of 
investors and PE firms. What terms and provisions are still necessary and which ones are 
outdated? Are the contracts ensuring that LPs, who lock their investments for extended periods, 
sufficiently protected from the moral hazard of PE managers? Better transparency can also 
stimulate the liquidity of secondary PE markets. Is this liquidity valuable to investors, as Bollen 
and Sensoy (2016) seem to suggest?  
 
Regional distribution of funding and deals 
Regional imbalances in finance provision have been a policy concern because firms with 
growth potential can lack investment (Martin et al. 2015; Mason and Harrison 2003; Mason 
and Pierrakis 2013). Although much attention has focused on the initial equity gap for small 
early-stage firms, there is growing recognition of an equity gap for older firms (Wilson, Wright 
and Kacer 2018). PE-backed buyouts contribute to regional growth and regeneration but 
evidence is needed on the extent of the gap in provision in different regions. We know that 
business angel (Harrison, Mason, and Robson 2010) and venture capital (Mueller, Westhead, 
and Wright 2012) investors are prepared to cross regional borders, but analysis is also needed 
of the extent to which buyout funding needs to be physically located within a particular region. 
Such analysis needs also to explore the role of intermediaries rather than simply finance 
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providers themselves. For example, advisors may often take deals directly to national financial 
centres – does this undermine regional financial centres or is it a reflection of the inability of 
these centres to fund deals? 
 
Portfolio firms 
Deal sources 
As we have seen above, the performance evidence on SBOs is mixed but studies typically say 
little about the impact of incoming and outgoing board members’ expertise on deal 
performance. Do primary (outgoing) PE sponsors sell too early or do follow-on (incoming) PE 
sponsors have different skills from those of primary sponsors? This is an important area where 
deal-level board evidence is needed since a shift from financial (monitoring) expertise in the 
primary buyout to entrepreneurial (value-adding) expertise in the SBO may be required for 
further gains to be achieved. Many so-called SBOs are in fact third or fourth time around deals, 
but little is known about them. To what extent do consecutive deals simply involve a 
continuation of previous strategies, or efforts to be more entrepreneurial, or perhaps 
turnarounds of struggling firms? 
 
While private family-owned firms are often viewed as a vendor source with potential for 
growth in LBO activity, the volume and value of this potential vendor source generally remains 
rather flat. Further, there are instances where founders have bought back for nominal sums the 
companies they sold as buyouts because the companies got into trading difficulties. Analysis 
is needed of the extent and drivers of this phenomenon. For example, to what extent are trading 
difficulties due to the loss of the specific human capital expertise once founders have exited, 
or their failure to develop a competent managerial team before selling the business? Is their 
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desire to buyback the company related to altruistic and reputational reasons, which means that 
they do not want the business they have been associated with to fail? 
 
Innovation and entrepreneurship  
Prior research has found that PE has a positive impact on patenting activity. We have little 
evidence on whether this is a result of an increase in R&D expenditure, more productive use 
of R&D expenditure, or a more active patenting strategy. An understanding of these issues 
would aid interpretation of PE’s contribution to better resource utilisation and/or increased 
investment. Increased market size and maturity in the sector will lead to increased PE firm 
specialisation with respect to portfolio management. Thus, we could expect to observe specific 
PE firm types targeting innovative firms and deals in more innovative sectors. 
 
Sources of post-buyout productivity gains are still unclear. To what extent are they the result 
of cost-cutting or improved innovative practices? Research examining a direct link between 
innovation and productivity would be useful. In such analysis, distinguishing between product 
and process innovation would help identify a potential driver of productivity gains. A link with 
process innovation could increase productivity while also cutting production costs. More 
informal and managerial innovations beyond formal patenting activity have received limited 
research attention. 
 
Internationalization by PE and PE-backed firms 
There is an increasing trend of cross-border investing by PE firms, more recently involving PE 
firms from developed markets targeting new industry sectors in emerging markets (Wright, 
Pruthi, and Lockett 2005; Groh and Liechtenstein 2009). Strategic alliances through co-
investment or joint ventures can help PE firms to strategically position themselves and 
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maximize value in an increasingly competitive global landscape (Roy 2015). Research on both 
the historical and forecasted impact of strategic alliances on PE could offer insights into the 
industry as a whole, where it is headed, and where it should perhaps be headed. How PE firms 
use strategic alliances, especially in a scenario of new regulations in emerging economies such 
as restrictions on foreign investors’ equity participation in strategic sectors, or foreign 
investment through ‘portfolio investments’ traded on stock, futures or commodities exchanges, 
OTC markets, or via clearing and custody systems duly registered with and recognized by local 
authorities (Binnie 2013), is a fertile research area. Studies should consider the effect of 
different institutional contexts on the types of PE investors that dominate, and the consequent 
implications for longevity of investment and performance (Cumming, Siegel, and Wright 
2007). 
 
Although there is an extensive literature on exporting propensity and intensity by 
entrepreneurial firms (Wright, Westhead, and Ucbasaran 2007), there is limited analysis of 
such internationalization behaviour by PE-backed buyouts and whether PE-backed buyouts 
differ from other firms in this respect. In principle, a buyout provides incentives for new owner-
managers to be more entrepreneurial in seeking out new revenue sources from international 
markets. PE firm involvement may include monitoring to bring financial discipline over the 
costs of internationalization as well as expertise and contacts that can facilitate exporting for 
the first time or increase the intensity of exporting. Evidence suggests that monitoring, rather 
than value-adding inputs, by PE firms is significantly more important for buyouts than for early 
stage VC-backed firms in helping internationalize the firm (Lockett et al. 2008). Further 
research is necessary to explore pre- and post-buyout dynamics of internationalization. Studies 
are also needed to examine the direction and modes of internationalization, and provide insights 
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into the relationship between the type of PE firm investor, as well as the international 
experience of portfolio company board members on internationalization. 
 
Individual level 
Board, and TMT composition and cognition 
Also imperative in the context of a maturing PE industry is an understanding of individual-
level factors differentiating the performance of various PE funds. Future research is needed to 
explore aspects of prior entrepreneurial or PE investing experience of individual partners in PE 
firms and their role in the exit potential of their portfolio companies.  
 
As portfolio firm founder characteristics influence PE strategies (Gompers et al. 2016), a 
related research issue is the nature of portfolio firms’ top management teams (TMTs), and role 
of their size and composition on PE firms’ strategies. Additionally, career trajectories of 
managers post-exit require examination. There is research on entrepreneurial exit relating to its 
drivers and what happens to entrepreneurs after exit (Wennberg et al. 2010). For example, 
acquisitions trigger a process of ‘entrepreneurial re-cycling’ in which entrepreneurs use their 
newly acquired wealth, allied to the experience they have accumulated, to engage in other 
entrepreneurial activities, notably starting new business ventures and investing in other 
businesses as business angels or venture capitalists (Mason and Harrison 2006). Beyond limited 
indirect evidence that some managers of buyout firms may become serial entrepreneurs by 
buying into other businesses post-exit (Wright, Robbie, and Ennew 1997), we have little 
analysis of post-exit behaviour of buyout firm managers, either in circumstances of success or 
failure.  
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Data challenges 
A major problem for PE research concerns the availability of data (Cumming and Johan 2017). 
Many studies analysing funds use proprietary private data, making it difficult to verify findings, 
as well as possibly being success biased. Analysis of the impact on portfolio firms typically 
involves combining at least two datasets, one that identifies deals and the other containing data 
(e.g. profitability, employment, and patents) to analyse outcomes from PE-backed deals. 
Combining datasets sometimes involves merging on name, which can introduce error unless 
other data such as post/zip codes are available. Available datasets may also be biased because 
of their reliance on publicly available data; even if they are compiled from thoroughly scraping 
the web, non-publicised deals are not captured. These databases are also more likely to identify 
larger deals than smaller ones, which introduces further bias.  
 
Government databases can be connected to PE databases, subject to strict confidentiality 
conditions. Governments collect a variety of data on firms through comprehensive surveys and 
submission of company reports. Detailed survey questions or a requirement in company filings 
to provide information on the nature of ownership or organisational change would help 
research, which often informs policy. Although many papers have increasingly used worldwide 
datasets, exploration of the contextual differences between different countries has been limited. 
Most PE studies focus on mature Anglo-Saxon markets and on relatively large transactions. To 
some extent this may be down to the coverage of worldwide datasets. Sourcing quality data 
from developing countries can be problematic. Further, idiosyncrasies in some countries will 
make some research impossible. For instance, Indian firms have no requirement to report 
employment data.  
 
Conclusions 
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In this article we have taken stock of the systematic evidence relating to PE-backed buyouts 
over the last two decades. We use evidence to debunk myths and explore opportunities for 
future research. The PE market has demonstrated considerable resilience and adaptability over 
the past twenty years. The now substantial body of evidence relating to the impact of leveraged 
buyouts and PE has provided considerable support for both agency-theoretic and 
entrepreneurial explanations. The market has matured, and increased competition brings 
challenges to fund raisers and value creation in portfolio firms. Nevertheless, the last 20 years 
have shown that the PE industry is robust to financial shocks and the business model continues 
to evolve, which provides a basis to extend the buyout and PE research programme. 
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